REMARKS

The claims have been amended without adding new matter in order to correct minor informalities and to address other issues raised by the Examiner. Claims 21, 31 and 37 have been amended. Claim 35 has been cancelled, and claims 1-20 were previously cancelled. Therefore, twenty six (26) claims remain pending in the application: Claims 21-34 and 36-47.

Applicants respectfully request reconsideration of claims 21-34 and 36-47 in view of the amendments above and remarks below.

By way of this amendment, Applicants have made a diligent effort to place the claims in condition for allowance. However, should there remain any outstanding issues that require adverse action, it is respectfully requested that the Examiner telephone the undersigned at (858) 552-1311 so that such issues may be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 112

1. Claims 35, 40 and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim that which Applicants regard as the invention. Claim 35 has been cancelled rendering the rejection of claim 35 moot. Applicants have amended claims 31 and 47 to recite in part "receiving a keyword over a second communication channel," and thus the rejection of claims 40 and 43 as being indefinite has been overcome. Support for such amendments is provided through the application as filed. For example, at page 3, lines 30-31, the application recites "keywords may be carried/transmitted in a second channel." Therefore, the application as filed provides support for the amendments of claims 31 and 47.

Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 102

2. Claims 21-23 and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), as being anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 6,184,877 (Dodson et al.). However, independent claim 21 has been amended to recite in part "bookmarking the keyword." Support for this amendment is

found throughout the application as filed. For example, on page 17, lines 22-23, the application recites "keyword may be the product name which the user may bookmark."

The Dodson patent does not teach or suggest at least "bookmarking the keyword" as incorporated into claim 21. To the contrary, the Dodson patent teaches away from bookmaking in that a user initiates a search based on a current program using the TV display that includes "content sensitive program information include[ing] current program title, the actors staring in the program, the start time, and the end time." (Dodson, col. 2, lines 61-64). Therefore, claim 21 is not anticipated by the Dodson patent.

Further, claims 22-23 and 28 depend from independent claim 21. Therefore, claims 22-23 and 28 are also not anticipated by the Dodson patent for at least their dependency on claim 21 and the reasons provided above.

Claim Rejections - 35 U.S.C. § 103

3. Claims 24, 29-34, 37, 39, 41 and 44 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a), as being unpatentable over the Dodson patent in further view of U.S. Patent No. 6,499,057 (Portuesi). As indicated above, claim 21 has been amended to provide for the "bookmarking" of a keyword. The Portuesi patent also fails to suggest bookmarking. The Portuesi patent teaches does describe creating a "history" of URL sites accessed by a user, but this is in contradiction to bookmarking and teaches away from bookmarking. The user must access the URL in order for the URL to be recorded. This requires the user to interrupt the currently viewed program to access the URL instead of allowing bookmarking which can allow for later access. Independent claim 37 has been similarly amended to include "bookmarking" and as such is also not obvious over the combined references. Therefore, independent claims 21 and 37 are not obvious over the combination of applied references.

Claims 24, 29 and 30 depend from independent claim 21, and claims 39, 41 and 44 depend from independent claim 37. Therefore, claims 24, 29, 30, 39, 41 and 44 are also not obvious over the Dodson and Portuesi patents for at least the reasons provided above.

Independent claim 31 has also been amended to read in part for example "receiving a keyword associated with the video image over a second communication channel.... embedding the keyword in the video image." The amendment to claim 31 includes language similar to that of claim 35 (now cancelled). Neither the Dodson nor the Portuesi patents suggest embedding the keyword in the video image. Therefore, amended claim 31 is also not taught or obvious in view of the applied references.

Further, the Examiner rejected claim 35 as unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 5,809,471 (Brodsky) in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,819,284 (Farber et al.), and specifically references the Brodsky patent in an attempt to demonstrate that the "embedding" of keywords in the video image was taught. The Examiner further argued that the Brodsky reference "extract[s] words and/or items from an audio, video or telephony signal (Brodsky 4:40-42) where embedded keywords are inherent in order for extraction to occur." (Office Action, page 13, lines 12-14, emphasis added). However, based on the Examiner's evaluation, it is clear that the keywords are part of the broadcast received by the system and thus does not "embed" the keywords received over a second channel. Further, the Brodsky patent teaches away from embedding the keywords in the video image in that the Brodsky patent describes extracting and not embedding the keywords, as specifically identified by the Examiner. Therefore, the applied patents fail to teach or make claim 31 obvious, and thus claim 31 is in condition for allowance.

Claims 32-34 depend from claim 31. Therefore, claims 32-34 are also not obvious over the applied references for at least the reasons provided above.

4. Claim 25 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over the Dodson patent in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,819,284 (Farber et al.). However, claim 25 depends from claim 21, and as indicated above, the Dodson patent does not teach each element of claim 21. Further, the Farber patent also fails to teach at least bookmarking. Still further, one skilled in the art would not combine the Dodson patent with the Farber patent as these are unrelated technologies. More specifically, the Farber patent relates to a screen saver on a computer, where the Dodson patent relates to television and thus one skilled in the art would not

reference the Farber patent in relation to the Dodson patent. Additionally, there is no motivation to combine the Farber patent with the Dodson patent as there is no apparent benefit suggested by Dodson. Alternatively, only through the benefit of the teaching of the present application would one appreciate the use of a profile in embedding keywords in a video image. Therefore, the applied references fail to teach or make obvious the method of claim 25, and thus Applicants respectfully submit that claim 25 is in condition for allowance.

5. Claims 26 and 45-47 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over the Dodson patent in view of U.S. Patent No. 5,809,471 (Brodsky). Claim 26, however, depends from claim 21, and it has been demonstrated above that the Dodson patent fails to teach each element of claim 21. Further, the Brodsky patent also fails to teach at least bookmarking as recited in claim 21. Therefore, claim 26 is not obvious over the applied combination of the Dodson and Brodsky patents.

Further, neither the Dodson nor the Brodsky patents teach or suggest "receiving a code included with the keyword" as recited in claim 26. The Examiner admits that the Dodson patent does not teach or suggest codes and has equated "priorities" as described in the Brodsky patent to the "code" as recited in claim 26. Applicants respectfully submit that the "priority" of the Brodsky patent is not a "code" as recited. The Brodsky patent instead only describes setting priorities to determine whether a word is search when the word has a sufficient priority. More specifically, the Brodsky patent describes "only search[ing] for items or words assigned with at least a moderately high priority level, and actually retrieve information only for items or words assigned with a higher priority level than that of the moderately high priority level." (Brodsky, col. 6, lines 8-11, emphasis added). This priority cannot be equated to a code that "assists in the searching of the network for information relating to the keyword" as recited in claim 26. Further, the priority of the Brodsky patent does not "assist in the searching" but instead defines whether to search. Therefore, the Brodsky patent does not teach or suggest

Still further, the Brodsky patent does not teach or suggest "receiving a code included with the keyword" as recited in claim 26 (emphasis added). To the contrary, the

Brodsky patent specifically describes "allow[ing] the setting of priorities for all `items` and/or `words`." (Brodsky, col. 5, lines 48-49, emphasis added). The priority of the Brodsky patent is not included with the keyword or received as recited in claim 26. Therefore, claim 26 is not anticipated or obvious over the Dodson and Brodsky patents.

The Examiner also rejected claims 45-47 over the combination of the Dodson and Brodsky patents. Independent claim 45, however, recites in part for example "receiving a code relating to the keyword over the second communication channel." As indicated above, neither the Dodson nor the Brodsky patents teach or suggest codes. Instead, the Brodsky patent only describes a "priority" that is set to define whether a search is performed based on a word or item. This "priority" is not equivalent to a code as recited in claim 45. Therefore, claim 45 is not obvious over the applied references.

Still further, claim 45 recites "receiving information relating to the keyword and the code." The Brodsky patent does not receive information relating to a "priority" of a word. The "priority" instead simply defines whether a search is performed. Therefore, any information that might be received is not related to the "priority." Therefore, the applied references do not teach or make the method of claim 45 obvious.

Claims 46 and 47 depend from claim 45 and are also not obvious for at least the reasons provided above. Further, claim 45 recites "searching a network for information relating to the keyword and the code." The Brodsky reference does not suggest searching for information relating to the "priority." Therefore, the Brodsky patent does not teach or make obvious the method of claim 46.

Still further, claim 47 recites that "the code comprises a numerical tag." The Examiner indicated on page 12 of the subject office action that "Official Notice" is taken that priorities can be based on numerical values. However, a numerical value of a priority is not equivalent to a "numerical tag" as recited in claim 47 where specific information is related to the numerical tag. The "priority" described in the Brodsky patent does not associated with specific

information and instead identifies whether a search is performed or not. The Brodsky patent does not teach a "numerical tag" and a number valued priority is not equivalent to a numerical tag as recited in claim 47. Therefore, claim 47 is not obvious over the applied references.

6. Claim 27 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over the Dodson patent. Claim 27, however, depends from claim 21 and as indicated above, the Dodson patent fails to make claim 21 obvious. Therefore, claim 27 is also not obvious in view of the Dodson patent for at least its dependency on claim 21.

7. Claims 35, 40 and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over the Brodsky patent in further view of the Farber patent. Claim 35 has been cancelled rendering the rejection of claim 35 moot. Claims 40 and 43 depend from independent claim 37. Independent 37 was rejected over the combination of the Dodson and Portuesi patents. Therefore, Applicants assume that the Examiner inadvertently left out the Dodson and Portuesi patents in defining the reject, and that claims 35, 40 and 43 are rejected as unpatentable over the Dodson patent, in view of the Portuesi patent, in further view of the Brodsky patent, and in further view of the Farber patent.

Claims 40 and 43 each recite language similar to that of claim 31. As indicated above, none of the applied references or their combination teach or suggest embedding the keyword in the video image. Further, the Examiner relies on the Brodsky patent to demonstrate the embedded keyword. However, the Brodsky patent teaches away from embedding the keyword in the video image, and instead as pointed out by the Examiner describes "extract[ing] words or items from an audio, video or telephony signal (Brodsky 4:40-42)." (Office Action, page 13, lines 12-13, emphasis added). Therefore, the combination of applied references teach away from embedding keywords in a video image, and thus claims 40 and 43 are not obvious over the applied references.

8. Claims 36 and 42 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the Dodson patent in view of the Portuesi and Farber patents. Claim 36 depends from independent claim 31, and claim 42 depends from independent claim 37. Applicants demonstrated above that independent claims 31 and 37 are not taught or obvious in view of the applied references. Therefore, claims 36 and 42 are also not obvious over the applied patents for at least the reasons provided above.

9. Claim 38 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the Dodson patent in view of the Portuesi and Brodsky patents. Claim 38 depends from independent claim 37. Applicants demonstrated above that independent claim 37 is not taught or obvious in view of the applied references. Therefore, claim 38 is also not obvious over the applied patents for at least the reasons provided above.

Further, claim 38 recites in part that the "keyword includes a code." Applicants demonstrated above, with reference to claims 26 and 45-47 that the applied references fail to teach or suggest that the keyword include a code. Therefore, claim 38 is not obvious in view of the applied references, and thus claim 38 is in condition for allowance.

CONCLUSION

Applicants submit that the above amendments and remarks place the pending claims in a condition for allowance. Therefore, a Notice of Allowance is respectfully requested.

Respectfully submitted,

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

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